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ABSTRACT
Over a fourth of India’s population suffers acute poverty and deprivation. A critical part of concern 
must go to the process of extending welfare benefits to the poor, as public service delivery of these 
programs frequently suffers from technical flaws and administrative inefficiencies. Whereas India’s 
major programme for food security– the Public Distribution System – is largely criticised for erroneous 
inclusion and exclusion of beneficiaries, and diversion of food subsidies that accentuate the inability of 
people to access food, Cash Transfer as an alternative service delivery mechanism seeks to eliminate 
inefficiency and corruption by giving money directly to the poor. This paper compares the implementation 
of PDS and Cash Transfer in Delhi to look into the necessity of formulating public policy that defines 
appropriate and effective mechanisms to ensure food security. The objective of the study is to evaluate 
the possible outcome of CT as a dependable solution for ensuring food security while drawing attention 
to the implementation of the most popular in-kind transfer program in the country, that is, PDS, to attain 
food security. An empirical investigation using questionnaires-based survey covering 80 households and 
eight Focus Groups Discussions with beneficiaries, and interviews with concerned implementing agencies 
showed that both schemes formed an important basis in sustaining households’ basic needs, and had 
spill over effect on gender equation at the household level. Yet, exclusion and corruption continued to 
a larger extent in PDS compared to CT, and both lacked effective responsiveness and accountability in 
governance mechanisms.
Highlights
 m Both PDS and Cash Transfers supported households’ basic needs enabling spill over effect on gender 
equation at the household level. Exclusion and corruption are higher in PDS compared to CT and 
both lacked effective responsiveness and accountability in governance mechanisms.
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It is no secret that, despite the government 
legislating, funding and implementing several 
welfare schemes for the poor, over a fourth of 
India’s population still suffers acute poverty and 
deprivation. According to the Suresh Tendulkar 
Committee on Poverty (2009), the poverty ratio in 
India is 21.9 percent for 2011-2012. The Rangarajan 
expert panel on Poverty estimated poverty ratio in 
India at 29.5 percent for 2011-2012 suggesting that 
the poor are those who are unable to spend ` 32 and 
` 47 per day in rural and urban areas respectively 
(Planning Commission, 2014). A critical part of 
blame must go to the process of extending welfare 
benefits to the poor, as public service delivery of 
these programs frequently suffers from technical 
flaws and administrative inefficiencies. For instance, 
India’s major in-kind transfer scheme – the Public 
Distribution System (PDS) that seeks to support 
and provide physical and economic access of food 
to the people – suffers from not just exclusion and 
inclusion errors but is also infested with leakages, 
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with a substantial chunk of these subsidies going to 
unintended and ineligible beneficiaries that defeats 
the very intent of the scheme.
PDS adopts targeting-beneficiaries approach 
facing both technical and administrative problems. 
It encounters two major types of errors - Type 
I error meaning errors of wrong exclusion and 
Type II error meaning errors of wrong inclusion. 
The Type I error excludes the deserving poor 
households and the Type II error includes ineligible 
households (Swaminathan 2000). Furthermore, the 
cost of delivery and administration in targeting the 
population is high demanding high administrative 
competence and commitment. The task of collecting 
and segregating exact information based on the 
income level of the poor is almost impossible. It 
is argued that these factors lead to weakening of 
the welfare especially because targeting a section 
of population to meet the objectives of food 
policy is seen as a ‘dangerous policy’ and almost 
synonymous with ending the PDS as it does not 
necessarily mean increasing benefits for the poor 
(Swaminathan 2000). Targeting is also very prone 
to fraudulent practices because of the high demand 
for limited resources of food commodities. Corrupt 
practices owing to diversion and black marketing 
takes place in tandem; the huge gap between 
the price of BPL food grains and open market 
encourages diversion and illegal sale in the market 
leading to high leakages of food resources exposing 
the severity of corruption in implementing agencies. 
The illegal profits would be very high if, in the past, 
the estimation of a diversion of one truck procured 
an illegitimate return of about ` 60,000 (Mooij 
2001). The Planning Commission in 2008 reported 
that only 42 percent of subsidized grains issued by 
the central pool reach the target group. Leakages 
are one-third of total BPL allocation and in some 
states, almost three-fourth (Planning Commission 
2005, 83). Such administrative inefficiencies and 
corruption severely hamper poor people’s access 
to food resources.
It is a well-known fact that the Government designs 
welfare programs for poverty alleviation. The 
Government also seeks to evaluate the viability 
of its schemes against certain parameters namely 
economic utilization of resources, improving 
efficiency, transparency, accountability and lessening 
corruption. Similarly, the National Committee on 
Direct Cash Transfer (DCT) 2012 pitched such 
acknowledgements. To prevent the drawbacks and 
malpractices taking place in PDS, Cash Transfer 
(CT) as an alternative service delivery mechanism 
is debated by several scholars as a method of policy 
correction. Proponents of CT believe that it can plug 
leakages and reduce corruption, which is rampant 
in PDS. A comparative study of CT, that is, social 
pension schemes and PDS revealed that CT is more 
progressive and effective in targeting and delivery 
of services as it is less affected by corruption and 
leakages, which usually happens in PDS (Dutta 
et al. 2010). India has had a vast experience in 
implementing CT for several decades through old 
age pensions, maternal incentives, scholarships, and 
wage for work and so forth. However, the course 
of implementing CT to attain the goals of food and 
nutritional security is of a recent experience. Until 
now, Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) 
led pilot projects have primarily studied the impact 
of CT for household-level food and nutritional 
security in Delhi and, the impact of basic income 
transfers in the rural villages of Madhya Pradesh 
(SEWA Bharat and UNICEF 2014).
On 15 December 2012, as an alternative service 
delivery mechanism for welfare schemes meant for 
the poor, the Delhi Government formally launched 
a Direct Cash Transfer (DCT) programme known 
as the Dilli Anashree Yojana (DAY) to provide 
food subsidy to the poor. Through this scheme, it 
obtained firsthand experience in Cash Transfer (CT) 
Pilot Projects. The eligibility criteria for people to be 
included as beneficiaries under DAY was that their 
family income should not be more than one lakh 
per annum and they should not possess cards of the 
PDS meant for accessing subsidized food. Official 
figures reported that out of the total 7.5 lakh BPL 
families in Delhi, only 4.09 lakh were eligible to get 
ration card under PDS. DAY benefited those ‘poor 
families who had been left out of the PDS system 
due to a cap on the number of beneficiaries fixed 
by the Centre’ (Business Standard 18 December 2012). 
Therefore, the scheme sought to cover those poor 
households who lived below the poverty line, but 
not covered under the PDS in Delhi. It provisioned a 
monthly cash entitlement of ` 600 to be transferred 
directly to the bank account of the women heads of 
households.
This paper presents a comparative analysis of PDS 
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and DAY in Delhi by looking at the difference in 
delivery mechanisms of these two welfare schemes 
that had a similar objective, that is, to ensure food 
security. Another reason that made the two schemes 
comparable is that the targeted beneficiaries of 
both the welfare schemes stood on a similar socio-
economic scale as did the households selected 
for the survey. The study reflects on the current 
complexities of policy choice with regard to cash 
and in-kind transfers seeking to provide food and 
nutritional security. One of the objectives of this 
study is to evaluate the possible outcome of CT as 
a dependable solution for ensuring food security. 
It is an attempt to assess if a CT scheme like DAY 
achieve the objectives of efficiency, transparency, 
accountability and eliminating corruption. Another 
important objective is to draw attention to the 
implementation of the most popular in-kind transfer 
program in the country, that is, PDS, to attain food 
security. It studies the progress and shortcomings, 
if any, of the PDS and DAY schemes, which aim to 
facilitate households’ food and nutritional security. 
It aims to look into the necessity of formulating 
public policy that defines appropriate and effective 
mechanisms for public service delivery to ensure 
the wellbeing of the poor.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The field study was conducted from February 2015 
to April 2015. The sampling area was determined 
according to the administrative and institutional 
set up of the Department of Food and Supplies 
and Consumer Affairs of Delhi Government 
that executed PDS and DAY. According to the 
department, there are nine District Offices in Delhi; 
across these nine District Offices, there are 70 Circle 
Offices that manage the ration cards of the PDS 
beneficiaries. The survey covered the District Offices 
of northwest, northeast, west, and southwest, which 
had the highest number of poor households that 
received food subsidy under PDS during the time 
of the study, as reflected in Delhi’s National Food 
Security website. The rationale for the selection 
of these sites, therefore, relied on the maximum 
concentration of PDS households in each district that 
is likely to give greatest choice for the sample, which 
makes the areas covered by these districts ideal for 
the study. In comparison to PDS data, the data of 
households for CT under DAY was not available in 
public domain. The Mission Convergence, Delhi, an 
implementing agency of DAY, provided households 
data for respondents under DAY. In view of the 
fact that DAY was implemented for a period of 
one year and then terminated, the most logical way 
to make a comparative study of PDS and CT was 
to select the beneficiaries from the same District 
Offices from where the PDS households were 
chosen. This comparison has helped to understand 
the change in perspective, if any, of beneficiaries 
while moving onto provision of subsidized food 
under PDS to CT under DAY. Therefore, for DAY 
too, the chosen District Offices were northwest, 
northeast, west and southwest for the reasons stated 
above. The questionnaire-based survey covering 
a sample size of 80 households, 40 households 
each from PDS and DAY, and eight Focus Group 
Discussions (FGD) formed the basis of the primary 
data. Open-ended interviews with the Fair Price 
Shops (FPS) dealers helped to understand their 
working and relationship with the beneficiaries. 
Both structured and non-structured Interviews were 
also conducted with officials of the implementing 
department. Secondary sources were drawn from 
books, journals, government database, newspaper 
reports, articles and websites from online sources.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The exclusion of targeted eligible beneficiaries from 
utilizing welfare benefits was higher in PDS than 
DAY. Only 68 percent of households received food 
entitlement from PDS as against 95 percent of DAY 
households that received CT. The cases of exclusion 
herein refer to those households that did not receive 
their entitlements even though they were registered 
for the programme. Fundamentally, a ‘Right to 
Food’ programme should ensure food security to 
all eligible households. However, NFSA seeks to 
cover only 75 percent of the population in the rural 
areas and 50 percent of the population in urban 
areas. Against a narrowly targeted programme 
leading to large exclusion errors, there is a general 
hypothesis that universal coverage would achieve 
wider coverage of eligible households with large 
errors of wrong inclusion and less exclusion. A 
trade-off between these two types of errors would 
ideally seek to improve the coverage by expanding 
the inclusion of the deserving households and 
minimizing wrong exclusion errors. This is because 
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wrong inclusion errors can cause fiscal deficit or 
financial costs but wrong exclusion leads to welfare 
costs that cost both individual and society in the 
form of hunger and malnutrition. This approach 
presents that welfare costs caused by hunger and 
malnutrition is harder to measure than fiscal costs 
(Swaminathan 2000, 102). Universal coverage also 
avoids targeting errors; Tamil Nadu state in India 
implementing a universal PDS is a case in point 
(Balani 2013). The general assumption is that the 
transition from universal to targeted distribution 
leads to the inclusion of non-poor as beneficiaries 
and correspondingly the exclusion of poor families 
(Planning Commission 2005, 74). Such errors were 
due to a mix of factors ranging from identification 
errors to administrative malpractices. This study has 
exclusively pointed out the exclusion of targeted 
eligible beneficiaries from receiving their entitled 
benefits. Unfortunately, whatsoever the reason 
behind ineffective targeting or wrong exclusion, 
the thread of implication always runs between 
two knots: loss of welfare to the poor people and 
increase in the delivery cost for the government 
(Planning Commission 2005, 80).
Under the NFSA, PDS guarantees highly subsidised 
food grains of wheat at ` 2 per kg and rice at ` 3 
per kg. In Delhi, the allotment is usually 4 kgs of 
wheat and 1 kg of rice. According to the survey, on 
an average, beneficiaries received 3.25 kilogram of 
wheat and 1.18 kilogram of rice per head per month. 
PDS performed well in delivering the allotment 
of rice but there was a short fall in delivering the 
entitled quantity of wheat. However, FPS dealers 
did not pursue the legal price for sale of foodgrains 
set by the Act. The major drawback in PDS was that 
approximately 58 percent of households paid more 
than the legal price. Some households paid ` 15 per 
kg for wheat and ` 22 per kg for rice to the FPS 
dealers. Only one-third of the respondents admitted 
to paying the stipulated amount of the subsidized 
ration as mandated under their respective ration 
cards. The notion of welfare subsidy was eroded 
by making the poor pay more than the legal price 
set by NFSA. Black-marketing was one of the major 
reasons why corruption was endemic in PDS. In 
DAY too, the CT fell short by some amount casting 
a shadow on fair practice in CT. Under DAY, the 
actual cash entitlement was ` 600 per month. Given 
that the government implemented DAY for a year, 
beneficiaries should have received a sum of ` 7200. 
Out of 95 percent of the respondents that received 
cash directly in their bank accounts, only 72 percent 
of households were able to recall the approximate 
total amount of CT. Out of those who recalled the 
amount, DAY households received an average total 
amount of ` 6962. According to this estimation, 
DAY beneficiaries received 97 percent of the entitled 
CT thereby implying three percent of the allotted 
amount did not serve the intended purpose and 
got diverted or lost. The percentage of amount lost 
might not seem a big amount, but it did not rule 
out the possibility of siphoning off a greater sum in 
future if neglected. If households do not receive the 
entitlement in full, CT might not serve the purpose 
of countering leakages and corruption like that of 
dishonest means practiced by PDS intermediaries 
such as FPS dealers.
Out of eighty households from both PDS and DAY, 
42 households preferred cash and 38 households 
preferred food subsidy. This number put CT above 
in-kind transfers as the choice of mechanism of 
service delivery with 52 percent out of eighty 
households opting for it. Nevertheless, the fact 
is that 48 percent of the people preferred PDS as 
food subsidies remain indispensable to the poor. 
Findings showed that majority of those who tried 
CT preferred cash and the majority of those who 
tried PDS preferred food; amongst PDS households, 
the better off preferred cash, and the poorer 
amongst them preferred food. Similar findings 
were observed in other studies (Baksy, Jaggi and 
Gupta 2013; Davala, et al. 2015; Sewa Bharat 2012). 
Several reasons quoted by the respondents for their 
preference for CT were multiple uses to which cash 
can be put and the flexibility it affords such as 
purchasing better quality rations and food, adding 
to their savings and investing in their children’s 
education and future. CT schemes like DAY can 
have an impact on households’ dietary intake. 
The UCT experimental project in Delhi observed 
a change in the pattern of households’ diet intake 
compared to previous consumption under PDS; CT 
enabled households to shift to nutrients rich food 
such as non-cereal commodities including pulses, 
meat, milk, and eggs (Gangopadhyay et al. 2015). 
The SEWA led CT pilot projects also observed 
that CT as supplementary income transferred to 
women creates a substantial positive impact on 
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households’ health, education and nutrition (SEWA 
Bharat and UNICEF 2014). The CT under DAY had 
served as a complementary means to ensure basic 
households needs. Welfare schemes like DAY that 
improved people’s purchasing power had a positive 
spillover effect in achieving food and nutritional 
security, together with access to education, clothing, 
healthcare and sanitation practices. Some chose CT 
because of the limitations and inefficiency of PDS: 
PDS allocation was less; food quality from PDS was 
of poor quality; FPS was crowded; and FPS was too 
far. For some, the foremost reason to opt for CT was 
their aversion towards PDS because of improper 
and allegedly corrupt behaviour of FPS dealers. 
Despite black marketing at the food distribution 
level, and irregular service delivery and tiresome 
efforts to purchase subsidized food grains, majority 
of PDS households still found the food subsidy 
indispensable. Although they were charged higher 
than the legal price, the poor would continue to buy 
food grains from FPS at a price slightly lower than 
the open market price. 
Therefore ,  most  of  the  PDS respondents 
preferred subsidized rations to cash despite 
many predicaments, as it remained vital for the 
households. Several PDS respondents were critical 
of the system itself as well as against the FPS 
dealers yet preferred to continue with its service. 
They argued that PDS, at least, was an assured 
way of obtaining subsidized food. This, many 
respondents feared, may not be the situation 
under CT. Nevertheless, almost every respondent, 
including those supporting PDS, complained that 
not all family members’ names were enlisted on the 
ration card; this created problems for ensuring food 
security to the households. Some who preferred 
to receive food offered reasons against CT, rather 
than positive reasons for PDS, such as that the cash 
amount was low and prone to misuse, along with 
banking problems. Many respondents felt that CT 
of rupees 600 was too low to meet their dietary 
needs; they would shift to CT provided the amount 
under the scheme was increased. Most of the FGD 
participants too were critical of the working of FPSs 
yet they stressed that the food subsidy remained 
indispensable to them due to the assurance of 
food given under PDS and the affinity and comfort 
developed due to long experience with it. The CT 
and food subsidy under DAY and PDS respectively 
served as vital supplementary aids to sustain their 
livelihoods.
Major impediments at the last delivery point were 
likewise, in both the schemes, deficiency of right 
entitlement to the beneficiaries, and again in PDS 
charging the poor extra money for the subsidized 
food, also compromised food security, and the 
neglect of these issues compounded the problem 
of food insecurity in these households. One of the 
reasons for the rampant black-marketing in PDS 
could be due to the very low commission earned 
by the FPS dealers at the time of the study. The FPS 
dealers, at that time, were receiving a commission 
of 70 paisa on every kilogram of ration sold, which 
was very low and they reported to have found it 
difficult to manage the shop. In the beginning of 
the year 2018, the Delhi government hiked the FPS 
dealers’ commission by 300 percent and the practice 
of black-marketing in PDS is shown to have reduced 
considerably (Ngullie 2018). Nonetheless, corruption 
in the form of giving less than the entitled amount 
of food appears to be in practice (Ngullie 2018). 
In addition, grievance redressal mechanisms and 
accountability of service providers were found to 
be weak in both PDS and DAY. Although some sort 
of Helpline was set up to redress grievances, these 
facilities were not disseminated to the concerned 
beneficiaries effectively. Therefore, there is a lack of 
people’s participation in monitoring and governance 
mechanisms in both PDS and DAY. Case studies of 
CT in Mozambique, Palestine and Yemen show that 
beneficiaries not only desire an increase in the size 
of CT and regular payment but seek participation 
in governance and supervision of the programmes 
(Jones, et al. 2016). Beneficiaries from both DAY 
and PDS beneficiaries desired an increase in the 
amount of CT or foodgrains and regularity in 
service delivery.
Overall, both schemes showed a positive gender 
impact and women feel empowered. It had a 
positive impact on women’s decision-making role 
in households’ food consumption and finances 
handling. Women respondents from both households 
felt a sense of social and economic empowerment 
being the beneficiaries of the program. For instance, 
CT provided to the families in the name of female 
heads made women in households economically 
empowered as was evident from the responses of 
DAY beneficiaries. Receiving cash also made them 
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‘feel good’. Similarly, ration cards provided in the 
name of female member of the families made them 
feel empowered.
CONCLUSION
Cash transfers and in-kind transfers within the 
purview of policy choice have been a matter 
of contention especially when its objective is 
to provide food and nutritional security to the 
people. Any policy alternatives should pledge to 
secure an appropriate and effective mechanism to 
ensure that the welfare benefits do reach the poor. 
CT as an alternative service delivery mechanism 
markedly promised to deliver economic efficiency, 
transparency with accountability and elimination 
of corruption, which PDS was mostly criticized 
for lacking in these. CT is undoubtedly another 
supportive solution, apart from PDS, to provide 
food and nutritional security to the poor. Yet, 
both are not without any shortcomings; cases 
of exclusion and corruption still persists to a 
larger extent in PDS compared to CT. Lack of 
effective grievance redressal mechanisms including 
lack of people’s participation in monitoring and 
governance mechanisms is apparent in both the 
programmes; the concerned implementing agencies 
and service providers are not held accountable, 
which ultimately weakens the impact of the 
program. For effective and inclusive participation 
of the poor, it is vital to begin with participative 
and transparent methods in registering beneficiaries 
and putting in place institutional mechanisms for 
social accountability to ensure that entitlements, 
as promised, are delivered to achieve a greater 
impact on the beneficiaries’ wellbeing. PDS remains 
indispensable for the poor and DAY served as an 
effective alternative route to deliver welfare benefits 
and to meet similar objectives as PDS, that is, food 
security. The social security net provided primarily 
to the poor households formed an important basis of 
the household’s food and nutritional security. Both 
schemes, seeking to address poverty and attain food 
security, had a spill over effect on gender equation 
at the household level.
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